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PART I.  INTRODUCTION 
The competitive zeal ingrained in the very fiber of American culture is perhaps 
never more clearly manifested than in the love of sports. This desire for competition 
begins in the childhoods of millions of young Americans, and drives the most dedicated 
and talented athletes into the zenith of whatever sport they choose to pursue. 
Unfortunately, as has been evidenced by the recent performance-enhancing drug1 [fn 
should be after comma] scandals in Major League Baseball, this competitive ambition 
can lead elite athletes to seek physiological advantages over their peers by immersing 
themselves in the experimental use of drugs.2 The ethical quandaries this poses for the 
competitive integrity of the sports themselves are many; however, the athletes themselves 
are at the very least capable of making informed decisions on the possible benefits they 
could reap from such a course of action (such as better statistics, possible increase in 
salary, etc.) versus the risks (possible adverse physical side-effects, long-term damage, 
etc.).3  
Alas, with respect to the “athletes” of one of the world’s oldest sports—that of 
horse racing—horses are unable to make such decisions based upon informed consent.4 It 
is indeed possible that if the highly decorated thoroughbred Big Brown could have 
 
1 Performance-enhancing drug (“PED”) is a broad, all-encompassing term that can refer to any number of 
traditional drugs (steroids, human growth hormone, etc.) or nontraditional (cobra venom) to bolster or 
augment existing physical prowess for training or performance purposes to gain an advantage on 
competition. Competitive sports leagues at every level have almost universally banned the use of PEDs, but 
as will be explored in the foregoing sections, horse racing has generally taken a far more passive posture 
towards banning these drugs.  
2 Daniel Engber, Hi-Ho, Steroids, Away!, Slate, (June 27, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2008/06/hiho_steroids_away.html. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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spoken during his career, he too would have deemed it prudent to take Winstrol5 in the 
pursuit of winning a race, with the aim of being able to retire earlier to a lush farm replete 
with an abundance of hay and oats.6 It is this impropriety that allows horses to be 
exploited via the administration of PEDs solely to further the interests of the trainers, 
owners and jockeys (among others), thereby compromising the competitive integrity of 
the sport by obliterating any semblance of an even playing field, and more egregiously 
endangering the well-being of the animals.7 [Consequently?] This article will explore the 
prevalence of PEDs within the horse racing world, the significant issues this creates for 
the safety of the animals, as well as some proposed policy changes both via federal 
regulation and through industry reform for curbing this ever-increasing problem. [Besides 
the horses, aren’t jockeys “athletes” in horseracing too, just as race drivers are in auto 
racing?] 
Performance-enhancing drugs abuse may be the biggest issue facing horse racing 
in the United States.8 A 2012 investigation reported that 3,800 horses had tested positive 
for drugs, the majority for illegal levels of prescription drugs.9 The investigation 
indicated that approximately 24 horses a week die at racetracks in America, an 
exponentially greater number than in other countries.10 The wide-spread use of injury-
masking and performance-enhancing drugs has led to the creation of a crisis in the 
industry that is destroying the reputation of the sport, along with the far worse 
 
5 A very common and pervasive drug administered to horses to boost physical acumen. [Should be in 
sentence form—not just a clause] 
6 Engber, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 John T. Wendt, Article, Horse Racing in the United States: A Call for a Harmonized Approach to Anti-
Doping Regulation, 25 J. Legal Aspects Of Sport 176 (2015). 
9 Id. at 176. 
10 Id. 
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consequence of sabotaging the health of these majestic animals.11 Because there are 38 
separate state racing commissions with different sets of rules and practices, the horse 
racing industry is struggling to reach any degree of uniformity with respect to testing 
standards and punishment for violations.12  
This article and accompanying statistics will address the adverse effects of drug 
abuse in the three main types of horse racing: flat racing (which includes thoroughbred 
racing), harness racing (also known as “trotting” or “pacing” with a two-wheeled cart), 
and steeplechase.13 An in-depth analysis of the disjointed regulatory scheme affecting the 
various types of horse racing, and the accompanying issues it breeds, will be borne out in 
the foregoing sections. Part II of this article will provide an historical background of the 
sport itself, including its ancient origins and evolution over time, along with the rise of 
PEDs within the sport, highlighting some recent high visibility scandals that have brought 
renewed attention to this issue.  
Part III will address the details around the PEDs themselves, including the effects 
they have on the animals. Part IV will examine the underlying reasons PED abuse has 
become so rampant in the sport, highlighting the influx of gambling money into the 
industry. This section will also touch on the general lack of a centralized system of 
oversight to govern and enforce anti-PED measures, including the lack of uniformity in 
penalties among the various racing jurisdictions. There will also be a discussion on the 
governance model employed by horse racing and an exploration of specific regulatory 
and legislative controls that already exist, as well as their shortcomings. Part V will 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 9th Race, Types of Horse Races, http://www.9thrace.com/handicapping/types-of-horse-races.html(last 
visited Apr. 20, 2017). 
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propose a number of possible remedies to the aforementioned issues, including the 
implementation of a federal regulation, the establishment of a central governing body to 
oversee the sport on a quasi-independent basis from the government, a joint effort by the 
horse racing community and elected officials to fund new testing methods for PEDs, and 
a number of proposed penalties for violations. [Don’t need to list each “remedy” in Intro] 
Part VI will offer a summation of key points and a final conclusion.  
PART II.  BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. Origins of and Rationale for Horse Racing  
[Put this paragraph at end of section]The anatomy of the horse lends itself 
perfectly to competitive racing.14 A horse’s legs are "clean and long" consisting of strong 
bones, muscles and tendons. “When running, its rear legs act as springs when they bend 
and straighten, propelling the horse forward”.15 The front legs continue this motion as 
they pull the horse forward. “Thoroughbreds also possess a long neck which moves in 
rhythm with their legs”.16 This rhythm allows the horses to extend their stride fully, 
enabling them to reach and sustain speeds surpassing forty miles per hour.17  
[This paragraph should start section, not the prior one]The sport of horse racing is 
one of world’s oldest, with records of it tracing as far back as 4500 BCE.18 Organized 
horse racing dates back as far as 638 BCE as an event in the ancient Greek Olympics.19 
 
14 Kyle Cassidy, Comment, Reining in the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horseracing: Why a 
Federal Regulation is Needed, 24 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 121, 125 (2014).  [How different are your 
remedies from his?]  
15 Id. at 125. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Luke P. Breslin, Comment, Reclaiming the Glory in the “Sport of Kings” – Uniformity is the Answer, 20 
Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 297, 300 (2010). 
19 Id. at 300. 
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Modern horse racing originated around the 12th century, when English knights returned 
from the Crusades with Arabian horses, which were known for their speed.20 The history 
of thoroughbred horseracing in the United States, however, dates back to the mid-18th 
century.21 The first recorded instance of it took place in 1745 in Annapolis, Maryland, 
when Governor Samuel Olge "first staged a thoroughbred race in English Style,” 
meaning a race of thoroughbred horses, with mounted jockeys, running a dirt or grass 
racecourse at distances ranging from three-quarters of a mile to two miles.22  
The popularity of horse racing continued to surge in the United States, with its 
peak arriving in the mid-Twentieth century. Spectator attendance at tracks between the 
years of 1946 and 1973 increased from 26 million to 53.3 million.23 The last several 
decades have seen a decrease in attendance and general interest in the sport, although the 
seminal events of horse racing, especially the American Triple Crown and Breeder’s Cup, 
continue to solicit enormous interest.24 
B. The Role of Gambling in Horseracing  
In evaluating the primary reasons for the original rise in popularity of the sport 
and the [sustained level?] levels of interest that continue to be seen today, horse racing’s 
inextricable link to gambling cannot be ignored. Historically, “bookmakers” would set 
the odds of a given horse winning a race and then solicit people to gamble against them 
based on those odds. This served as the original link between horse racing and 
gambling.25 In the early Twentieth Century, bookmakers and prominent members of local 
 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 298. 
22 Id. at 301. 
23 Id. at 302. 
24 Id. 
25 Bradley S. Friedman, Oats, Water, Hay and Everything Else: The Regulation of Anabolic Steroids in 
Thoroughbred Horse Racing, 16 Animal L.123, 128 (2009). [[Animal L. J.??] 
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jockey clubs26 shared mutual benefits in this enterprise. By taking bets at the track, larger 
bookmakers would draw customers to the races and pay the track owners a fee for 
running their gambling operation on location.27 The racetrack owners likely encouraged 
bookmakers because their presence attracted customers and allowed the owners to 
increase purse sizes for winning horses and thus attract more racers and greater esteem.28 
 It was out of this culture that the American Jockey Club was born. The Jockey 
Club was founded (and continues to operate) as a private organization, with backing and 
support from industry officials and stakeholders.29 It was initially tasked with the 
ostensible purpose to promote and improve the sport. In reality, it had the constructive 
purpose of regulating the rampant presence of gambling, a function it would serve until 
state racing commissions interceded later in the Twentieth Century.30 
Gambling on horse racing today is called pari-mutuel wagering, a system wherein 
the race track receives a fixed percentage of the total amount wagered in order to cover 
expenses, such as operating costs, racing purses and state and local taxes.31 Once these 
expenses are subtracted from the total amount, the balance is returned to a pool and 
shared among all winning bets. 32 Given the robust enthusiasm for sports betting in the 
United States, as is evidenced not only with horse racin, but by the ever-growing “fantasy 
 
26 Decentralized organizations that oversee and register horses for racing events.  
27 Friedman, supra note 25, at 128, 129. 
28 Id. at 129. 
29 Medication and Performance Enhancing Drugs in Horse Racing: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 112th Cong. 26 (2012) (statement of James Gagliano. 
President and C.E.O of the Jockey Club), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112shrg76248/pdf/CHRG-112shrg76248.pdf. 
30 Friedman, supra note 25, at 129. 
31 Breslin, supra note 18, at 302. 
32 Id. 
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sports”33 industry, [fn should be placed after comma] it is of little surprise that pari-
mutuel wagering occupies such an integral role in the vitality of the sport. Unfortunately, 
certain horse racing industry members resort to unethical or illegal means to gain a 
competitive advantage in the name of heightened earnings or the prestige of greater 
success. The most obvious way to achieve this has been through illicitly augmenting the 
physical characteristics of the horses via performance-enhancing drugs. 
C. The Rise of Performance-Enhancing Drugs and Accompanying Scandals 
It is unclear precisely when performance-enhancing drugs became a staple of 
modern horse racing, but all indications are it began as far back as the early Twentieth 
Century.34 The New York Times reported the developments of drug use in horseracing 
during the 1890s.35 The 1800s had seen the purification of cocaine and morphine and 
availability of these substances made the “acute stimulant medication” of racing horses a 
far more common occurrence.36 Steroids37 did not emerge as a performance-enhancing 
tool until the 1960’s. They were used in equine veterinary medicine to treat horses that 
suffered from dangerously decreased muscle mass, and were given to geldings38 
regardless of their physical state.39 It is unclear when the use of steroids as a performance 
 
33 Although there is no consensus as to whether fantasy sports constitute formal wagering, the basic 
principle is that users select certain athletes to produce favorable statistics over a set period of time (single 
game, season) etc. Point values are assigned to statistical thresholds being met, and winners are determined 
by whoever earns the most points at the conclusion of the time period. See generally Louis Bien, 
Everything you ever wanted to know about daily fantasy sports and why they’re getting sued, SB Nation 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/2015/11/24/9791608/draftkings-fanduel-daily-fantasy-sports-
lawsuit-new-york-internet-gambling. [Last visited?] 
34 Bennett Liebman, The Trainer Responsibility Rule in Horse Racing, 7 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J.1, 4 (2007). 
35 Id. at 5. 
36 Id. at 4. 
37 Generally considered to be any form of hormonal substance closely related to the male hormone 
testosterone. [Write in sentences] In addition to naturally occurring testosterone, steroids can be 
synthetically created in laboratories for a variety of medical purposes. See Friedman, note 97, at 136. 
38 Castrated male equines. [Write in sentences!] 
39 Friedman, supra note 25, at 136. 
 
8 
 
enhancer proliferated among trainers, but in 2003, Pennsylvania racing officials found 
that more than 60% of all horses racing in that state had been treated with at least one 
steroid.40  
Despite this apparently long and sordid history of doping in horse racing, it has 
only been within the past decade or so that the interest of the general public has been 
piqued. As was previously alluded to, the highly publicized steroid scandals in Major 
League Baseball around some of the sport’s greatest players spurred the interest of both 
lawmakers and casual fans to at least consider the PED climate in other sports.41 Events 
emanating from within the horse racing world itself, however, are what have contributed 
to the recent impetus for change. 
One such event occurred at the 2008 Kentucky Derby, where a horse named Eight 
Belles finished in second place at the race, but—having just passed the finish line, 
collapsed from two broken ankles.42 Disturbingly, Eight Belles was then euthanized on 
the track in front of 200,000 spectators and millions more watching on television at 
home.43 A mere few days later, the trainer of the victorious horse from the Derby, Big 
Brown, glibly admitted that the horse was treated with the steroid Winstrol right before 
the race, and he would continue to treat Big Brown and other horses with steroids to 
enhance their performance prior to every race.44  
The shockingly casual nature of the trainer’s admission raised eyebrows in the 
mainstream public, but perhaps the most damning high visibility event of recent years 
 
40 Id. at 137. 
41 Id. at 140. 
42 Id. at 141. 
43 Runner-up Eight Belles Breaks Front Ankles, Euthanized on Track, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/horse/triplecrown08/news/story?id=3380100 (May 3, 2008). 
44 Bill Finley, New York Unveils Steroid-Free Racing, 158 N.Y. Times B8 (Jan. 2, 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/sports/othersports/02racing .html.  
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was an explosive PETA report on another prominent trainer, Steve Asmussen.  Asmussen 
is one of the most highly recognizable trainers in the industry, and arguably the most 
successful. He ranks second in career victories, totaling more than 6,700, has earned 
more than $214 million in winnings and was even included on the National Museum of 
Racing’s Hall of Fame Ballot.45 Over a period of several months, an undercover PETA 
employee clandestinely filmed the regular routines engaged in by his assistant trainers: 
practices that included administering multiple drugs daily to racehorses — “whether they 
(needed) them or not — by grooms and employees so they (could) pass veterinarians’ 
visual inspections, make it to the racetrack or perform at a higher level.”46 This video 
contained more than seven hours of footage documenting various forms of mistreatment, 
including prominent New York veterinarians administering drugs to the horses.47 The 
subsequent[public?] outrage called for wide-spread reform efforts, but also a desire by 
regulators and fans to gain a deeper understanding of the exact effects certain drugs can 
have on the animals.  
PART III.  EFFECTS OF DRUG ABUSE 
A. Common Uses of Performance-Enhancing Drugs 
In conducting the analysis of the drugs used in horseracing, it is prudent to first 
point out that no uniform consensus exists on whether all drugs should be banned outright 
from the sport. Indeed, many drugs have therapeutic qualities that do not affect the racing 
performance of horses.48 Two of the more commonly used permissible drugs are Lasix 
 
45 Joe Drape, PETA Accuses Two Trainers of Cruelty to Horses, N.Y. Times B13 (Mar. 20, 2014) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/sports/peta-accuses-two-trainers-of-cruelty-to-horses.html?_r=2. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Kimberli Gasparon, Comment, The Dark Horse of Drug Abuse: Legal Issues of Administering 
Performance-Enhancing Drugs to Racehorses, 16 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 199, 206 (2009).  
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and Bute, both of which help to guard against excessive bleeding in the lungs. 
Phenylbutazone (an anti-inflammatory), and Cortiscosteroids (for pain) are also staples of 
most training stables.49 Steroids, on the other hand, are anecdotally used for the express 
purpose of bolstering racing performance. Steroids increase protein synthesis and 
resultantly increase a horse's metabolism, which coupled with an increase in diet, can 
result in overall growth in muscle mass.50 There is, however, little scientific or clinical 
data directly linking steroid use to the physical denigration of horses; the correlation lies 
in the fact that horses bred for racing possess relatively delicate skeletal frames that 
cannot support the massive addition of muscle mass spurred by consumption of 
steroids.51  
B. Physical Consequences and Impact of Use 
Unlike the use of steroids by humans, performance-enhancing drugs for horses 
can very quickly adversely impact the body of a horse. An increase in testosterone (or a 
synthetic alternative), for example, can create dangerous behavior in horses such as 
aggressiveness and “stallion-like” activity in otherwise perfectly trained and tamed 
mares.52 Most of the drugs allegedly used result in an exponential increase in blood 
volume, forcing a horse’s heart to process 65% more volume than normal even when in a 
sedentary state.53 While such side-effects are by no means trivial, they pale in comparison 
to the effects of drugs that can directly lead to fatal breakdowns on race days. “Two of 
the more common substances—phenylbuterol and demorphine (the key ingredient in 
 
49 Max Watman, So Far, So Good For Barbaro, N.Y. Sun (May 21, 2006) http://www.nysun.com/sports/so-
far-so-good-for-barbaro/33099/. 
50Friedman, supra note 25, at 137, 138. 
51 Id. at 140. 
52 Id. at 139. 
53 Id. 
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cobra venom)—act as painkillers that mask a horse’s nervous system so that it can run 
harder and feel little pain.”54 It is highly suspected that this was the precise causation of 
the tragic death of Eight Belles at the 2008 Kentucky Derby, (i.e. the horse was unable to 
heed bodily warnings to slow down, resulting in the breaking of both ankles and 
subsequent euthanasia).55 [parenthetical info should be placed in fn] 
In addition to concealing injuries, the administration of these types of drugs can 
also render pre-race health and safety examinations conducted on the horses moot.56 
California researchers have found that as many as 90 percent of horses that break down 
have pre-existing ailments or injuries.57 It is therefore widely contended that even legal, 
therapeutic drugs that serve merely as pain medicine actually pose the greatest risk to the 
horse, and this contention served as the primary driving force in England’s ban of any 
type of drug use in the sport.58 Significantly, the rate of horses fatally breaking down in 
England is now, on a percentage basis, [only?] half of what it is in the United States.59 
According to Dr. Manual Gilman, a New York racing steward, "any fair-minded person 
would say horses would be better off if they ran without medication,” noting that “it's not 
natural. Any medication has side effects."60 
 
54 Daniel Stone, Should Congress Police Horseracing?, The Daily Beast (Jul. 12, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/12/should-congress-police-horseracing.html. 
55 Id. 
56 Walt Bogdanich, Joe Drape, Dara Miles and Griffin Palmer, Mangled Horses, Maimed Jockeys, N.Y. 
Times A1 (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/us/death-and-disarray-at-americas-
racetracks.html?_r=0. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Joseph Durso, Horse Racing: Thoughts from The Glass Booth, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/05/sports/horse-racing-thoughts-from-the-glass-booth.html.  [Ancent 
history?]  
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Perhaps one of the more troubling facts of the state of drug abuse in the sport is 
that these types of incidents continue to occur at the highest level of racing—especially 
the Triple Crown races, which receive far more scrutiny and attention than the lower tier 
“claiming races.”61 It therefore begs the question of how pervasive and destructive an 
effect drug abuse is having away from the proverbial spotlight, where regulatory and 
public interest is even more scant. “Horses in (claiming) races are most vulnerable (to 
drug abuse), in part because regulators often give them less protection from potentially 
dangerous drugs.”62  In fact a New York Times study discovered horses in claiming races 
have a 22 percent greater chance of breaking down or showing signs of injury than horses 
in higher grade races, which strongly suggests that drug abuse is even more rampant and 
destructive at the lower levels of racing.63  [What years were included in the study? This 
is important to determine if it’s a current problem] When considering the obvious perils 
of drug use on horses, in conjunction with the apparent extensive prevalence of this 
practice throughout the sport at all levels, it quickly becomes clear that reform is needed, 
and that the existing controls on the industry are not acceptable safeguards for combating 
this growing problem.   
PART IV.  SURVEY AND ANALYIS OF EXISTING REGULATORY 
CONTROLS 
Before addressing proposed remedies for eliminating or at the very least curbing 
the use of performance-enhancing drugs on racehorses, it is first necessary to examine the 
existing regulatory controls on the horse racing industry both internally and externally 
 
61Bogdanich, supra note 56. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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which seek to mitigate the use of performance-enhancing drugs. This section will address 
the underlying root causes behind the drug use, examine the major governance models 
and jurisdictional rules in place across several states, and finally identify the primary 
failures of these controls.  
A. Factors Necessitating Regulation: Root Causes of Drug Abuse 
i. The Influx of Money and Corresponding Corruptive Influence 
Despite a comparative decline in popularity from its “heyday” in the mid-
Twentieth Century, horse racing has still managed to become a $10 billion annual 
industry, accounting for nearly 400,000 jobs.64  A good portion of this growth is the 
direct result of a 1978 federal policy that permitted betting on the sport across state 
lines.65 Between the late 1980’s and 2001, the gross amount wagered on horse racing 
domestically increased from $9.385 billion ($19.775 billion in today’s dollars after 
accounting for inflation)  to $14.550 billion ($20.258 billion in today’s dollars).66 “With 
this increase, purses for each race have climbed from $ 700 million to over $ 1 billion 
from 1990 to 2001.”67Accounting for inflation, in today’s dollars the $1 billion figure 
from 2001 would be equivalent to nearly $1.4 billion.68   [Data is 16 years old??] 
The sport has also benefitted from so-called “racinos” in several states that have 
converted race tracks into casinos (or merged them); several states have used these new 
venues as a way to “expand gambling, and that require the more-popular and profitable 
casino operations to effectively subsidize the racing purses.”69 The betting attention 
 
64 Stone, supra note 54. 
65 Id. 
66 Encyclopedia of American History, Horse racing and showing, http://www.answers.com/topic/horse-
racing-and-showing (last visited Apr. 8, 2017). 
67 Id. 
68 CPI Inflation Calculator, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 27, 2017).  
69 Stone, supra note 54. 
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focused on winning horses as purses in smaller races has dramatically increased due to 
the casino money now poured into them, resulting in the horses oftentimes being run or 
chemically augmented beyond their natural capacity.70 As noted in the prior section when 
discussing the claiming races, smaller racing venues that operate far away from the 
national stage merit more attention from regulators and policy makers because there are a 
far greater number of horse races at these types of forums than the large events, such as 
the Triple Crown, but the general attention and scrutiny is far less. [Break up long, 
multic-clause sentences!] As such, drug abuse is even more prevalent. As will be 
discussed further in the foregoing sections, smaller racing venues [should] require the 
same level of standards and penalties as the major events.  
ii. Challenges of Current Drug Testing Systems   
The myriad of drugs and medications now readily available for horses has proven 
to be highly cumbersome for existing testing structures to protect against because there 
are legitimate medical uses for steroids in racehorses. “Unlike with humans, where a 
medication can often be traced back to a doctor or prescription, it is not always possible 
to distinguish whether a steroid was given to a horse for a therapeutic purpose or as a 
performance enhancer.”71 
There currently exist only two processes for testing horses for steroids, urinalysis 
and blood tests. The problem with each is that neither has been fully developed, nor has 
either been clinically proven to have the accuracy required to enforce existing rules.72 
Moreover, there are other related issues that make the accuracy of both forms of testing 
 
70Id. 
71 Friedman, supra note 25, at 143. 
72 Kimberly S. Brown, TheHorse.com: The Steroid Debate, (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=11789.  
 
15 
 
tenuous.  Not enough is known about how quickly or completely steroids pass through a 
horse's system.73 In addition, not enough research has been done to accurately determine 
which steroids are present in positive samples.74  
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the current testing system, however, lies in the 
fact that laboratories are unable to keep up with the newest “cutting-edge” drugs made 
available by illicit chemists.75 Furthermore, trainers continue to try to evade the 
restrictions of the testing protocol by experimenting with “anything that might give them 
an edge, including cobra venom, Viagra, blood doping agents, stimulants and cancer 
drugs.”76 To this end, racing officials have long maintained that a great deal of illegal 
doping “occurs on private farms before horses are shipped to the track”, which is by 
design since few states are legally able to test horses there.77 
B. Summary of Existing Regulatory Controls and their Shortcomings  
Racing's lack of a powerful, central authority is a primary reason for the 
performance-enhancing drug issues that are plaguing the sport.78 Given the gravity and 
size of the sport, there are shockingly few restrictions on drugs in horse racing, due to the 
fact that there is no broad “oversight agency to regulate industry practices, police 
offenders, and levy fines, and in part because the athletes are animals. Most regulation 
 
73 Frank Angst, Steroid Study Reveals Wide Variance in Steroid Residue, (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www 
.thoroughbredtimes.com/national-news/2009/March/04/Steroid-study-reveals-wide-variance-in-steroid-
residue.aspx. 
74 Masayuki Yamada et al., Detection of Urinary Metabolites Common to Structurally Related 17a-Alkyl 
Anabolic Steroids in Horses and Application to Doping Tests in Racehorses: Methandienone, Methandriol, 
and Oxymetholone, 32 J. Analytical Toxicology 387, 387-91 (June 2008). 
75 Bogdanich, supra note 56. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Breslin, supra note 18, at 315. 
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falls to individual state boards that issue a mosaic of sometimes conflicting rules on how 
a horse should be raised, run, and tested.”79 
While many of the jurisdictions prohibit the use of certain drugs, relatively few 
tests exist to test the horses for those drugs.80 Trainers that do not face any sort of 
criminal penalty therefore have little incentive to keep their horses free from 
performance-enhancing drugs when they know they cannot and will not be caught.81 
Furthermore, as previously alluded to, the existing tests are unreliable and frequently 
result in false positives that unnecessarily penalize innocent trainers and owners.82 
i. State Racing Commissions  
Unlike other major professional sports leagues such as Major League Baseball or 
the National Football League, there is no national standard of rules [rule-making and 
enforcing authority?]  for drug testing in horse racing.83 Horse racing is governed in the 
United States at the state and local levels through state racing commissions, which 
thereby allow each state to regulate the sport as it sees fit. Indeed, the commissions 
generally have wide-ranging authority that includes the power of rulemaking and 
enforcement.84 Commissions, however, often pass regulations without having the 
resources to test for illicit drug use and/or enforce the law.85 Furthermore, the general 
lack of uniformity in the regulation and implementation of standards and enforcement of 
 
79 Stone, supra note 54. 
80 Gasparon, supra note 48, at 208. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 John Drape, Horse Racing: Amid the Run for the Roses, a new race to curb drug use, N.Y. Times (May 
5, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/sports/horse-racing-amid-the-run-for-the-roses-a-new-race-
to-curb-drug-use.html?_r=0.  
84 Friedman, supra note 25, at 144. 
85 Id. 
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penalties has allowed the proliferation of performance-enhancing drugs and abuse of 
medication.86  
By virtue of the fact that the thirty-eight racing jurisdictions operate 
autonomously, they are virtually by definition in some level of competition with one 
another for profits. Tracks with more horses and races naturally lead to higher sales and 
thus higher tax revenues generated for the local and state governments.87 Many racetracks 
and local/state commissions are thus highly keen [incentivized?] to implement as friendly 
conditions as possible for owners and trainers with an eye towards attracting more paying 
customers. As one might expect, this oftentimes leads to more lenient regulations with 
respect to drug testing.88 This is not to say that every state and local commission are 
prone to overly lenient regulatory controls, but it does help foster a system that is 
“disjointed and lacking in [uniform] control and accountability.”89  
Beyond the governance hierarchy of the sport, the actual testing methodologies 
that are performed in an effort to flush out the use of performance-enhancing drugs are 
themselves riddled with inconsistencies. There are eighteen different labs in the United 
States that are used to vet and test blood or urine samples from horses in the search for 
[for the discovery of?]  drug use; the problem is they employ eighteen different drug-
testing protocols.90 Even under a hypothetical "zero tolerance" rule towards any 
offenders, "zero tolerance" would not have the same criteria across all of the labs.91 In 
 
86 Breslin, supra note 18, at 299. 
87 Cassidy, supra note 14, at 129. 
88 Id. 
89 William Rhoden, Uncontrolled Sport May Not Merit Triple Crown Glory, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/sports/horse-racing-may-not-deserve-triple-crown- 
glory.html?adxnnl=1&ref=tomudall&adxnnlx=1348668021-SC+dh6BGh1iHRC+S0VKgUw. 
90 Christy West, AAEP 2008: Medication in Racing and Performance Horses, (Feb. 15, 2009), 
http://www.thehorse.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=13614. 
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addition to a lack of uniform procedures, research conducted in the field has to date 
provided no definitive answers regarding how long it takes a horse to reduce the levels of 
a drug in its body to the legal limit.92  
The testing criteria utilized among various officially sanctioned laboratories, 
however, are not the extent of the inconsistency.  Among the thirty-eight states that have 
some form of horse racing, twenty-eight have no regulations whatsoever with respect to 
anabolic steroids (interestingly, this includes the three states that host Triple Crown races 
of Kentucky, Maryland and New York).93 [paraentetical info should be placed in fn]“The 
remaining 10 states have a partial ban that makes an exception for four drugs—including 
the steroid Winstrol. And in the states with more stringent rules, the prohibitions apply 
only on race day, not during the months of training that come before.”94  
Because there is no federal law regulating drug use in racing, let alone a clearly 
defined industry-wide standard, regulators and commissions in individual states can be as 
harsh or lenient as they wish in punishing violators.95 Take, for example, New Mexico. 
Tests conducted on horses in New Mexico for the potent pain-killing medication Flunixin 
yielded results over “104 nanograms on 68 occasions since 2009, with some registering 
1,000 and even 2,400, records show.”96  These levels are so high that regulatory 
veterinarians in other states say [have claimed that?]  the horses must have been drugged 
on race day, a practice that is forbidden.97 To give this example more context, it should 
be noted that most test results for Flunixin register in between 35 and 50 nanograms.98 
 
92 Id. 
93Engber, supra note 2. 
94 Id. 
95 See Bogdanich, supra note 56. 
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19 
 
Despite these dizzying numbers, the current penalties in New Mexico for trainers who 
overmedicate their horses with the drug receive no punishment on their first violation, a 
mere $200 fine on the second and $400 for the third.99 Additionally, New Mexico 
removes any record of Flunixin violations every 12 months, thus allowing trainers to 
again overmedicate horses without penalty. Dozens of huge Flunixin overdoses have 
resulted in warnings only.100  
By contrast, other states have taken far more punitive postures with regard to drug 
offenses. Iowa, for instance, has implemented a blanket ban on steroid use in all 
racehorses.101 In Indiana, all winnings must be forfeited after the first drug offense. The 
rationale, as explained by Joe Gorajec, the executive director of the Indiana Horse Racing 
Commission, is “If someone who violates the rule thinks the penalties are going to be 
mild or nonexistent, then breaking the rules is just a cost of doing business.”102 By hitting 
the offenders where it really hurts (i.e. their wallets) Indiana positions itself to be a far 
more hostile environment towards would-be drug offenders. There is [appears to be?] no 
clear-cut reason as to why certain states are comfortable taking such relaxed approaches 
to drug enforcement whereas others are far less lenient.  
The decentralized, state-centric model allows for this, however, and perhaps is 
reflective of the cultural and demographic differences that define the United States [break 
up long sentences].  [In fact, it seems to replicate other defiations, as manifested?] in the 
various approaches to marijuana legalization, for example. The histories and local 
cultures of various regions in the country inform the legislative appetite [approach?]for 
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any number of policies, and it seems the regulation of horse racing is no different. [So, 
notwithstatnding?] the noble and even effective measures taken in states like Iowa and 
Indiana, the sport will never see [undergo?] the wholesale change to its culture it so 
desperately needs unless uniform standards are adopted--a task that has yet to come to 
fruition.  
ii. Legislative Efforts 
Despite the pervasive nature of drugs in the sport, the issue has not been 
unilaterally ignored by policy-makers either domestically or abroad. “The World Anti-
Doping Code unanimously was adopted103 by more than 600 sports organizations104 and 
governments of the world in Copenhagen in March 2003 with 665 signatories binding 
anti-doping regulation across all continents and sports.”105 Unfortunately, American 
horse racing is not one of the signatories, primarily due to the fact that many stakeholders 
in the industry either refuse to seek a harmonization of medication standards or deny that 
there is a problem altogether.106 Although as is the case with many voluntary 
international treaties, the actual enforcement measures are not particularly strong; the 
issue with the lack of signage is the larger message being sent that the horse racing 
industry has to date not viewed this drug epidemic as a problem worthy of greater 
attention. The possible benefits associated with an international coalition such as this are 
admittedly more symbolic; it is domestically and within the sport itself that true remedial 
measures need to be taken.  
 
103 Aharon Zorea, Steroids: Health and Medical Issues Today 77-83 (Greenwood Press, 2014). 
104 This includes international sports federations, national anti-doping organizations, the International 
Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, and several professional leagues in various 
nations. 
105 Wendt, supra note 8, at 179. 
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Legislative attempts in Congress to curb the destructive effects of drug abuse in 
horse racing have not been met with much success. The Horseracing Integrity and Safety 
Act of 2013 proposed the United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) as "the 
authority to permit/prohibit the drugs and medications that may be administered to a 
horse in a race subject to an interstate off-track wager and set the withdrawal period for 
its administration."107 Under this proposal, any horse receiving any drug within 24 hours 
of a race [would be] prohibited from racing. Additionally, race tracks “must have an 
agreement with USADA that includes terms and conditions regarding compliance with 
rules”.108  
The proponent of the bill, Congressman Joseph Pitts, stressed the need for a 
uniform approach to fighting performance-enhancing drug abuse in the United States.  
[break up long sentences.  “He stated], "Despite promises and assurances, state and 
industry groups have been unable to come together to develop uniform rules to police 
doping. . . . Congress must step in to offer a sound national framework to protect the 
horses, the riders, and the public."109 [It should be noted that?] The bill does not 
necessitate the establishment of any new federal agencies, and calls for funding to come 
from the industry through a percentage of the gambling bets or a series of fees from 
racetracks, horsemen groups, breeders, and owners.110 A portion of the financing would 
be collected from the racing associations, who before conducting a race with interstate, 
off-track betting, must enter into an agreement with USADA and comply with its anti-
 
107 Joseph Pitts, Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2013 (House of Representatives 2013). 
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doping rules.111 Unfortunately, [and] despite some initial bi-partisan support,112 it never 
even succeeded in obtaining a vote in the House, let alone consideration in the Senate. A 
revised version of the bill was proposed by the same sponsor in 2015, where it was 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, where it 
has not advanced.113 [This is a new Session—2017-18.  Has it been resubmitted???] 
There is not one clearly defined reason why progress on these efforts has stalled 
and support has been minimal. However, there are a few theories. One is that industry 
support for these measures is mixed as best, with a general reticence towards supporting 
federal interventionist regulation, which has resulted in strong lobbying against 
passage.114 “Separate from the racing industry’s split views on the anti-doping legislation, 
another obstacle to passage might be the political climate of Washington, D.C. itself,” 
[break up long sentences].  [“  The bill was assigned in both of its”]as the assignment of 
both iterations of the bill to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and 
Trade [“This has resulted in”]has presented lawmakers who possess only a passing 
familiarity with “racing’s highly specialized wants and needs,” a comprehensive proposal 
saturated with subject matter that is likely beyond their normal areas of expertise.115  
Should some version of the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act pass [be 
enacted], it would be the deepest and most meaningful foray Congress has made into the 
regulation of horse racing beyond wagering. To date, the federal government has given 
 
111 Id. 
112 The bill had 35 total co-sponsors, 30 Democrats and 5 Republicans. See Congress (May 17, 2013), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
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little indication it has the ability (or motivation) to regulate the industry. The Interstate 
Horseracing Act of 1978 (amended in 2007) holds that "it is the policy of the Congress in 
this Act to regulate interstate commerce with respect to wagering on horse racing, in 
order to further the horse racing and legal off-track betting industries in the United 
States."116 This statute has limited the involvement of Congress to merely regulating 
racing, solely with respect to wagering, thereby enabling discord by allowing each state 
to draft its own regulations. 
iii. The Racing and Medication Testing Consortium (“RMTC): Model Rules 
In 2001, the American Association of Equine Practitioners117 met to determine if 
an agreement could be reached regarding the need for a uniform policy for racehorse 
medication in the United States.118 The result of the summit was the Racing and 
Medication Testing Consortium (“RMTC”), created to develop an industry-wide uniform 
medication policy statement.119 The RMTC is comprised of 25 racing industry 
stakeholders and organizations that represent all types of horse racing in the United 
States, including trotters.120 “The RMTC has promulgated uniform model rules regarding 
anabolic steroids that have been adopted by 26 states.”121 Most of these states that 
currently regulate the use of steroids in horse racing have adopted the Model Rule either 
 
116 Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3001, et seq. (2007). 
117 A non-profit organization based in Lexington, KY, comprised of 9,300 veterinarians and veterinary 
students from 61 countries with the stated mission to “improve the health and welfare of the horse, to 
further the professional development of its members, and to provide resources and leadership for 
the benefit of the equine industry”. See About AAEP, https://aaep.org/about-aaep (last visited Apr. 25, 
2017).  [Good] 
118 American Association of Equine Practitioners, Text of Racehorse Medication Summit Report (Jan. 4, 
2002), http://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/7399/text-of-racehorse-medication-summit-report. 
119 Id. 
120 Hallie Roach, Drug testing task force provide updates (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://www.harnesslink.com/News/Drug-testing-task-force-provide-updates-
70298?highlight=harmonization.   
121 Alan Foreman, Racing Medication and Testing Consortium (Aug. 12, 2012), 
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in their entirety or in a slightly altered form.122 Others, such as Kentucky, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania and Washington have used the Model Rule as a baseline and either 
strengthened or loosened many of its regulations.123 
Despite the best intentions behind these efforts, however, there is no actual 
binding, coercive legal authority that holds anyone [any of the potential violaters?] 
accountable. The model rules provide a worthwhile standard of conduct to strive towards, 
but arguably amount to little more than grandiose rhetoric lacking any tangible 
enforcement authority. There also are some logistical issues with the Model Rules 
themselves as they relate to the guidance around performance-enhancing drugs. “The 
inability to distinguish the specific use of the steroid, for either therapeutic or 
performance-enhancing purposes, coupled with the fact that there is a requalification 
carve-out involving the veterinarian's list, causes major enforcement issues.”124  
C. Insufficient Deterrence To Recalcitrant Trainers and Owners  
It is self-evident from the preceding analysis that the existing testing procedures 
and penalties for violation do not create an ample enough deterrent to trainers and owners 
who seek to circumvent the rules. The actual tangible impact to the trainer’s long term 
disposition in the sport is minimal even when punitive measures are enacted because in 
many cases, upon being suspended, they can simply transfer control of the horse to their 
assistant.125  It might be naïve to suspect the trainer’s assistant would for some reason 
 
122 See e.g. 1 Colo. Code Regs. 208-1-5.331 (2009); Ill. Admin. Code tit. 11, pt. 603.210 (2008); 71 Ind. 
Admin. Code 8-1-8 (2008); 205 Code Mass. Regs. 3.19 (2009); Nev. Gaming Regs. 30.404 (2008); 9 N.Y. 
Comp. Codes, R. & Regs. 4043.15 (2009); Or. Admin. R. 462-160-0130 (2009); Tex. Admin. Code tit. 16, 
§ 319.364 (2009); and 11 Va. Admin. Code 10-180-75 (2008). 
123 See e.g. 810 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:018 (2009); Code Md. Regs. 09.10.03.04 (2009); Pa. SHRC-2008-01 
(2008); and Wash. Admin. Code 260-70-630 (2009). 
124 Friedman, supra note 25, at 147. 
125 Joe Drape, Barred for Drugs, Horse Trainers Return to Track, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/sports/05horses.html?_r=1. 
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adopt a more ethical posture towards the treatment of the horses in the primary trainer’s 
absence, but even if that were the case, the trainer’s access and right to the stable is fully 
restored upon completion of their suspension.126 Therefore, more sweeping, corrective 
actions must take place in order to curb this problem.  
PART V.  PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURES 
 As [demonstrated?], it is evident from the vastly disjointed and disparate nature of 
horse racing jurisdictions that the lack of uniformity in regulations and enforcement is the 
primary underlying cause that enables rampant drug abuse to saturate the sport, 
endangering the well-being of the animals. While there is admittedly no guaranteed 
remedy available that would instantly [quickly?] rectify all of the outstanding drug issues, 
what is beyond dispute is the current de-centralized, mostly unregulated model is 
woefully inadequate in preserving the health of the horses and the competitive integrity 
of the sport. Therefore, This section will propose several action steps that can be enacted 
(ideally in concert with one another) to help cleanse the sport of its performance-
enhancing drug issues.  
A. Implementation of Uniform, Federal Legislation  
The most obvious solution to cure the untenable inconsistency in regulation and 
application of enforcement measures would be to have the United States Congress enact a 
law that would explicitly outline standards, guidelines and punishments for drug offenses 
in all forms of horse racing. This of course presupposes a functional, operational 
Congress, something that has been conspicuously absent from the political landscape in 
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the recent past.127 As has been discussed, some states have been more diligent in 
attempting to combat this problem than others, but because there has not been any sort of 
uniform coalition among the states to impose stricter sanctions on the industry as a 
whole, federal legislation may be the best opportunity at doing so.  
The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2013 (and a later iteration proposed 
in 2015) [but what about its status in 2017 Congressional Session?] offers the most 
comprehensive and reasonable solution towards establishing a coherent anti-drug culture 
in horse racing. To reiterate, the chief aim of the law would be to “police thoroughbred 
doping and medication abuse via the establishment of a federal, non-governmental racing 
regulatory organization headed by the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA).”128 
Despite the bi-partisan nature of the proposed law, it has struggled to solicit the necessary 
support to even come close to a vote, let alone receive passage. “GovTrack, a government 
transparency organization that uses logistic regression analysis to rank the likelihood of 
passage of the 10,000 bills that come up annually in Congress,” gives the Bill a 5% 
chance of getting past committee and a 2% chance of being enacted.129 [This data should 
be put in fn]  Simply put, the passage of this bill would offer the most holistic and 
substantive reform of drug abuse in horse racing. Even in this era of divided government 
and finite resources, one would hope the revival of this bill would not be too ambitious of 
a goal for our elected representatives.  
 
127 Congressional “gridlock” has worsened over the last 50 years, and increased even more over the last half 
decade. For context, between 1947 and 2000, conference committees (groups appointed by both the House 
and Senate to resolve disagreements on a particular bill) averaged roughly 100 resolutions per 
congressional session. Between 2001 and 2012 this number dropped to 20. Between 2011 and 2013, only 7 
agreements were reached by conference committee. See Political Gridlock: Unprecedentedly dysfunctional, 
The Economist (Sep. 22, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/09/political-
gridlock. [Good, but it’s now 2017, so what’s up now??] 
128Thornton, supra, note 114. 
129 Id. 
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[But] Should the passage of this bill prove too cumbersome [difficult?] for 
Congress, another solution could be the amendment of an existing law, i.e. the Interstate 
Horseracing Act. Specifically, the law could be amended to broaden the federal 
government’s authority over the entire horse racing industry by adding required layers of 
compliance with drug prevention standards. Although realistically spurring Congress to 
act decisively on any issue may be an ambitious goal, the recently elected President has 
professed a strong appetite for cutting back on perceived superfluous regulations.130 As 
such, the chances of amending an existing regulation, rather than adding a new one 
dealing with similar subject matter, may be slightly more palatable. Furthermore, the 
chief aim would be to mitigate the effects of drug abuse on horses in the sport, which 
could still be achieved by incentivizing certain behaviors and barring others in the 
existing law which ostensibly is only concerned with gambling. 
According to the Interstate Horseracing Act, the federal government has interstate 
commerce authority over wagering and off-track betting.131 To allow for the federal 
government to regulate the entire horse racing industry, Congress could [would have?] 
amend the Interstate Horseracing Act to include language establishing a uniform 
regulatory structure around drug testing (including language allowing testing to be 
conducted off-site on the private training farms of the racehorses), and the permissibility 
of certain types of medication/treatment, etc.[avoid “etc.” in formal writing] Penalties for 
violation could include a complete ban on taking interstate bets on races that include 
horses that have failed drug tests. This could be facilitated by mandating a pre-race 
 
130 Steven Mufson, Trump wants to scrap two regulations for each new one adopted, Washington Post (Jan. 
30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/30/trump-wants-to-cut-
two-regulations-on-businesses-for-every-new-one-imposed/?utm_term=.8bce6380c92d. 
131 Interstate Horseracing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3001, et seq. (2007). 
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testing requirement for all horses participating in races with interstate wagering. 
Furthermore, should a given jurisdiction or state become a repeat offender in failure to 
fully comply, the federal government would have the authority to suspend all wagering 
on horse racing in that state altogether. Although this may seem like a hard-line approach, 
the threat of cutting off wagering profits would unequivocally garner the attention of the 
local states and their respective racing commissions, and would force them to take the 
issue seriously.132  
Although neither of the above proposals is currently being actively discussed 
[considered?]within Congress, this could quickly change with the engagement of 
appropriate lobbying and advocacy efforts. Organizations such as the American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals133 and PETA134 already actively participate in 
grassroots and political lobbying to advance legislative and policy agendas that call for 
the more favorable treatment of animals. Should these two collaborate to raise public and 
political awareness, perhaps [in collaboration with] other like-minded organizations 
within the animal rights field [sector?], traction could be gained within Congress to 
support one or both of the legislative efforts proposed above.  
B. Establish a Centralized Office to Oversee and Police the Sport 
 
132 A crippling shortcoming in some of the performance-enhancing drug testing in Major League Baseball 
has been the general perception of a lack of deterrence.  For example, when a player is suspended for a 
fixed amount of time for a violation, he is often able to return and continue to earn income from his 
contracted salary. There have been calls to have a player’s contract instantly voided following a failed test, 
which the player’s union has rejected. This is the underlying rationale, however, behind the proposed 
penalties for horse racing. 
133 ASPCA Advocacy Center, https://www.aspca.org/take-action/advocacy-center (last visited Apr. 28, 
2017).  
134 PETA: Passing Animal-Friendly Legislation, http://www.peta.org/action/activism-guide/passing-
legislation/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).  
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There have been calls from those both within the horse racing industry and 
external to it, to create a national governing body in the mold of the organizational 
structures of other professional sports leagues. This would allow a clear system of rules 
across jurisdictions to be implemented, with a uniform testing and penalty system for 
which all industry participants would be held accountable.  
There currently exists a loosely interconnected bureaucracy of organizations 
within the sport that could be leveraged as a basis for formulating this new central office.  
The Jockey Club already controls the breeding and licensing of all domestic 
racehorses.135 The National Thoroughbred Racing Association (NTRA) currently serves 
as "both league office for a big sport and trade association for a big industry, including 
related businesses like breeding."136 Additionally, the basic framework for uniform rules 
and regulations in horse racing is already in place via organizations such as the RMTC, 
ARCI, and the Thoroughbred Safety Committee.  
The creation of a new organization by leveraging existing structures and rules 
would serve as the most efficient allocation of time and resources to combat the issue. 
There is likely no existing federal body that could assume this role as easily as the 
amalgam of existing organizations within the industry forging together into a single 
entity. By establishing a national organization, the industry would be drastically better 
positioned to implement uniform and effective drug regulations. The organization could 
also establish a system of penalties that would have the same effect nationally, and 
dedicate resources to research new and effective ways of combating drug abuse. As 
 
135 Jockeyclub.com, About the Jockey Club, http://www.jockeyclub.com/about_tjc.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 
2017). 
136 NTRA.com, A letter from the CEO, available at http://www.ntra.com/industry.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 
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already alluded to, the challenge with this approach would likely be finding the requisite 
support among the various jurisdictions for coming together and forging a single entity.  
In evaluating what other existing sports league could serve as useful templates for 
horse racing to mirror in terms of corporate structure, the most apt analogy may actually 
be the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).137 “The NCAA is an 
unincorporated organization composed of nearly 1,000 voluntary members, which are 
four-year college institutions with competitive athletic programs”.138 The NCAA has a 
central authority body which has the ability to create committees dedicated to specific 
programs, however, each member school maintains the ability to govern and rule within 
its own parameters to some degree, thereby not totally eliminating their autonomy. 
Adopting something similar in horse racing would allow “state agencies to retain their 
power while also implementing uniform rules,” most obviously those around 
performance-enhancing drugs.139 DOUBLE-SPACE 
 
This would also allow for changes or updates to the rules, based upon updated research or 
testing techniques, to be more easily implemented than a system with pure federal 
oversight that would need congressional approval for any change. 
Because it seems apparent there will likely not be a cultural epiphany within the 
sport to begin collectively addressing this issue via the formation of a centralized 
authority under its own volition, it seems the only effective motivation could be from the 
threat of the previously mentioned congressional intervention. This would not be without 
precedent. Following gamblers “fixing” the outcome of the 1919 World Series, Major 
League Baseball adopted a more formal organizational structure, including the 
appointment of its first commissioner to oversee the league and enforce it rules more 
stringently,140 with the implicit understanding this would stave off congressional 
intervention. Many industry stakeholders have long opposed the idea of federal 
 
137 Gasparon, supra note 48, at 217. 
138 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988) (describing organization of 
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oversight,141 thus much like the pressure applied to other sports leagues that forced them 
to act on their internal issues, this may prove to be the only ample incentive to spark true 
reform in horse racing via the formation of a central league. 
C. Forge a Collaborative Effort Between Regulators and Industry Officials to Fund 
New Testing Methods and Enact Harsher Penalties  
 
In addition to establishing a uniform system of rules and regulations, along with a 
strong, centralized body to enforce them, the horse racing industry must also work to 
develop innovative and effective testing procedures. It is therefore imperative that the 
labs used to vet test samples coordinate their efforts to eliminate the inconsistent testing 
methods. “Currently, in the United States racehorses' test samples are submitted to one of 
a number of labs, both privately and state funded. It is difficult for the various states and 
private organizations to develop the best testing procedures, primarily due to insufficient 
funding.”142  It is therefore recommended that the industry foot the majority of the cost 
for heightened testing procedures. It is submitted that they probably have far greater 
expertise in the nuances of the sport and what needs to be guarded against. Moreover, as 
a matter of public policy, it would seem irresponsible for an excessive amount of 
taxpayer funds to be directed to a problem that the private sector should be equipped to 
handle. Despite the relative popularity the sport still enjoys among fans, the public’s 
interest by no means is so great as to warrant a significant expenditure of taxpayer 
dollars. If there is one uniform regime that defines the standards and penalties, whether 
from federal regulation or industry-specific rulemaking, the laboratories could simply be 
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instructed to follow the guidelines put in place as a means to permanently eliminate the 
disparate testing protocols that plague the sport today.   
Following an agreed upon baseline of rules and testing procedures, it then 
becomes critical--whether by federal regulation or drastically increased internal industry 
rules--the punishments for offenders becomes severe. The model employed in England 
seems to be particularly effective, wherein there is a complete ban on all drugs for horses. 
As was discussed earlier,143 the rate of fatal horse breakdowns in England is much lower 
than in the United States; with all other conditions being more or less equal it then 
becomes reasonable to deduce their far divergent handling of drug abuse is the primary 
driver of this disparity. This may be viewed as an overly-conservative approach, 
however, as there are certain drugs that can provide therapeutic value to horses.144 Break 
up long sentences.  “But such harsh action”] would dispel any sort of ambiguity around 
what drugs would qualify as a policy violation.  
One need not look as far as “across the pond” for templates on how to curb this 
issue, however. As discussed earlier, models employed by states such as Iowa and 
Indiana take a far harsher stance on drug abuse in horse racing than others, with the 
former employing a complete ban on all drugs and the latter mandating the forfeiture of 
winnings for horses that test positive for drugs.145 Incorporating elements of the 
regulatory regimes utilized in those two states, and/or England, would likely create potent 
enough standards and penalties to serve as ample deterrence to the continued abuse of the 
animals.  
 
143 Bogdanich, supra note 56.  
144 Gasparon, supra note 48, at 206. 
145 Finley, supra note 44. 
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[As to the resultant penalties?], it is submitted that for an initial offense of a horse 
failing a drug test, a one year suspension from all organized racing activity be levied on 
the jockey, trainer, owner and the horse itself. This would include a formal ban on access 
to all tracks and racing facilities associated with the newly formed league. The prospect 
of losing a full year of racing out of a horse, whose prime racing years are very limited to 
start, would be a devastating consequence for any ownership/training group. 
Additionally, there would be a two-year “look-back” provision embedded in the rules 
which would force all earnings won with that horse over the prior two years to be 
forfeited. The money would be provided to the central league office and then dedicated 
toward further drug testing research. This would instill a culture of accountability, where 
all interested parties would be forced to be extremely mindful of the conduct of every 
member on their teams, from top (owners) to bottom (jockeys).  
To further enforce this accountability, the second offense for a failed test would 
result in an immediate lifetime ban from the sport for all parties involved (jockey, trainer, 
owner and horse). All intervening winnings between the first failed test and the second 
failed test would again be forfeited. Furthermore, in addition to mandatory testing on the 
day of each race, horses would be subject to random drug testing at any time of year, with 
only 24 hours notice. This would include the ability for testing authorities to administer 
drug tests on the farms/trainer facilities where the horses are kept, thereby eliminating 
another venue where drug abuse is widely believed to be taking place.146 These efforts 
would further mitigate the risk of trainers simply timing the horse’s drug cycle to 
synchronize with known testing dates and locations.   
 
146 Bogdanich, supra note 56. 
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As an added layer of defense to guard against [persistent,] rampant abuse, it is 
submitted that racetracks could be mandated to have their licenses revoked if more than 
5% of their registered horses fail drug tests in a calendar year. The threat of closure and 
subsequent loss of business would invariably stir more interest in ensuring the horses are 
racing clean, and would place even more pressure on the general culture of the sport to 
evolve in such a way that will protect against drug use. Racetracks would presumably be 
far more cautious in vetting the horses/ownership groups being invited to compete, and 
would likely invest far more time and effort in performing due diligence before races to 
ensure the participants are fully compliant with the rules.  
As a final recommendation, should the threat of pecuniary penalty not serve as a 
powerful enough motivation to halt this behavior, harsher penalties must be [imposed?] 
contemplated. If after a five year period with the aforementioned penalties in place yields 
little to no change in the fatal breakdown numbers of horses at American racetracks, 
and/or more than 10% of all test samples come back positive,147 criminal sanctions must 
be implemented holding jockeys, trainers and owners criminally liable for the well-being 
of their horses. This is of course presupposing federal or legislative cooperation, whether 
at the onset of these rules or after the five year period has elapsed. All of these proposed 
penalties are unquestionably harsh. But, if the possibility of inflicting irreparable damage 
or death to these innocent animals is not enough of a deterrent to industry stakeholders 
who intentionally pump them full of drugs, perhaps [loss of employment or ownership?] 
the prospect of needing to find another source of income or the threat of incarceration 
will suffice.  
 
147 The newly formed governing body would be responsible for monitoring and tracking these figures. 
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PART VI.  CONCLUSION 
 Unlike the all-stars and pro bowlers [professionals?] of other major sports, the 
animal athletes in horse racing do not naturally seek the fame, glory and attention sought 
by their human counterparts. Indeed, an ideal day for a stallion would probably be 
comprised of a hearty romp through a meadow to a grove of readily available carrots and 
oats. It is therefore reprehensible that so many of them are flagrantly abused with various 
chemical concoctions--all in the name of furthering the success of their owners and 
trainer within the horse racing industry. The reasons for the prevalence of this abuse are 
many, but the more pressing concern for industry officials and policy makers should be 
finding solutions to curbing the problem before it envelops [damages?] more innocent 
horses. A uniform federal law defining standards and penalties, ideally in conjunction 
with the establishment of a central office of the sport to carry out and enforce agreed-
upon testing standards with better funded testing protocols and clearly defined, harsher 
penalties, would be a tremendous start to rectifying the litany of performance-enhancing 
drug issues that have been plaguing professional horse racing for years.  
  
